This paper addresses the choice between di®erent exit routes of venture capitalists for a project yielding a quality-improving product innovation. We explicitly introduce product market characteristics into the analysis with the aim to identify their e®ects on the optimal exit strategy and on the¯nancial contract. Going public can be more pro¯table than a trade sale (i.e., selling the venture to an existing company) when the new product is su±ciently innovative. Once thē nancial contract signed, this may lead to an agency con°ict if the entrepreneur enjoys private bene¯ts from staying an independent manager in the¯rm after the exit of the venture capitalist.
Introduction
Since most high tech start-up companies are initially unpro¯table, the exit route of the venture is the primary way how the venture capitalist can realize a positive return on her investment. Exit conditions are therefore crucial for¯nancing. The type of exit is not only an important issue for the venture capitalist, but also for the entrepreneur. The latter must understand that the venture capitalist will want to exit the venture in a not too distant future, and very often this means that the venture will be sold to another company (trade sale). If the entrepreneur nevertheless wants to keep control over the company afterwards and run it by his own, he will need to¯nd the funds required to buy out the venture capitalist. Otherwise, the venture is sold after few years to an existing¯rm.
For many years, the relative lack of venture capital in Europe and Asia has been blamed on the absence of active primary equity markets and in particular the absence of high-growth and high-tech segments such as Nasdaq in the US. Conversely, the slow development of stock markets has been blamed on the small investment in venture capital funds. In the US and in Europe, the two main exit routes are trade sale and initial public o®ering (IPO). New stock markets that have been created recently in Europe aim to make exit easier for investors like venture capitalists. The European Venture Capital Association (EVCA (2001)) reports that, on average for the last 5 years, exits of European private equity occurred through a trade sale in almost the half of the total amount (at cost of investment); and 18% were IPOs (the rest were either write-o®s or exits by \other means"). For the US, the NVCA reports a ratio trade sale over IPO of 1.1 for 1997 and 1.7 for 1998. A trade sale typically occurs after some bilateral negotiation with some existing¯rm, most often with one that is already present in the relevant market. In case of a trade sale, the ownership is then transferred to the acquirer. An IPO, in contrast, leads to the creation of a new independent¯rm and allows entrepreneurs to remain in control of their company after the venture capitalist's exit.
It has therefore been argued (e.g., by Black and Gilson (1998) ) that the strong link between an active venture capital industry and a well-functioning stock market is explained by the fact that IPOs generate implicit contracts for entrepreneurs over future control. The possibility for an IPO is told to provide the entrepreneur with a \call option on control". In contrast to a trade sale, a public listing allows the entrepreneur to remain in the company as independent manager, for which he very often gets non-monetary private bene¯ts. Many entrepreneurs therefore have a preference for an IPO over a trade sale.
So far, only little attention has been devoted to explain how the decision on the type of exit is made by venture capitalists. Most theoretical studies have taken either the exit value as exogenously given, or as a reduced form function of e®ort provided by entrepreneur and venture capitalist. But in fact, the exit route (i.e., IPO versus trade sale) can also have substantial e®ects on the value of the venture, and thereby the incentives of both parties during their contractual relationship.
The present paper deals with the e®ect of product market characteristics on the optimal exit strategy of venture capitalists. It provides a possible explanation for the choice between a trade sale and an IPO. Competition in the product market is modeled in a vertical product di®erentiation framework. This allows to model innovation in form of product quality improvements. We introduce explicitly product market characteristics into the analysis with the aim to identify their e®ects on the optimal exit strategy and on the¯nancial contract between the venture capitalist and entrepreneur.
It will be shown that highly innovative ventures do more often go public than less innovative (or imitator) projects, which are most often sold to incumbent¯rms. For less innovative start-up companies, competition would be so¯erce in case of entry of the newcomer that the incumbent has an incentive to make an o®er that is higher than what the company would get through a public listing. But when the start-up is more innovative, it di®erentiates itself from the incumbent so that the competition e®ect is weakened and the gain from a trade sale is reduced. The exit route of the venture capitalist is therefore endogenously determined on the basis of product market characteristics and the venture's depth of innovation.
In this paper, we also show that the possibility to enter into implicit contracts over control with the entrepreneur under an IPO may also have an important drawback; indeed, this also opens the door to an agency con°ict that has not been studied yet. The entrepreneur might take more risk (by implementing a more innovative research path) than what the venture capitalist would like if this guarantees the entrepreneur an IPO in case the project is successful. Since the explicit analysis of product market outcome implies that more innovative companies are more likely to go public, the entrepreneur might possibly try to come up with a more innovative product to make his company more attractive for an IPO in case of successful R&D. But the opposite can also be true. The entrepreneur might be willing to take less risk if he is sure by that still to remain independent after a successful R&D stage. We show that the use of optimal debt-equity mix can reduce, in some case even eliminate, this kind of distortion. The optimal allocation of control rights also a®ects the outcome; an optimal allocation allows to extract additional rents from a trade sale by reducing the bargaining power of the potential buyer.
We therefore provide an alternative explanation for excessive distortion by entrepreneurs when getting outside funding for their projects. The typical claim is that entrepreneurs take too much risk because they do not bear any¯nancial risk (another reason is excessive debt that generates hard claims for entrepreneurs). Here, excessive distortion stems from the \independence bias" implied by the private bene¯ts under an IPO. Since most innovative ventures are more likely to go public, the distortion represents an increase in risk taking at the R&D stage.
The main focus of the paper is to explain the choice of the venture capitalist between a trade sale and an IPO and to derive empirical implications. We present them in form of hypotheses to provide (hopefully) useful material for further empirical research. One of these will be illustrated with UK data; it provides empirical evidence that the likelihood to go public is positively related to pro¯tability. This is also con¯rmed by empirical studies (e.g., Cumming and MacIntosh (2000) , and Gompers (1995) 1 ). The model also implies that the potential distortion increases with the size of the entrepreneur's private bene¯ts. Thus, the venture capitalist needs to be even more aware of the possible distortion when contracting with an entrepreneur that shows high interest in controlling the¯rm afterwards.
This paper also discusses issues recently raised by other authors in empirical studies (e.g., Hellmann and Puri (2000), and Kortum and Lerner (1998) ) about the causality between innovation and the use of venture capital to fund projects. These studies provide evidences that the presence of venture capital fosters innovation (although the direction of this causality is not clear from their study). In this paper, we show that such a causality may exist and that the link is a®ected by the exit opportunities for the venture capitalist. In fact, because venture capitalists do not take into account the private bene¯ts of entrepreneurs at the exit stage, venture-backed companies are more innovative (i.e., the entrepreneur reacts by over-distorting the depth of innovation). This bias creates an additional channel in that venture-backed companies are more innovative on average as compared to self-¯nanced ones.
This paper is related to two di®erent strands of literature. One is the literature on venture capital contracting and control rights allocation. Papers typically focus on agency con°icts arising from abandonment issues and from how to avoid shirking by the entrepreneur (see, e.g., Aghion
and Bolton (1992), Cornelli and Yosha (1997) , Bergemann and Hege (1998) , and Hellmann (1998)).
Among other things, they highlight the importance of adequate incentive-based rewarding schemes, the optimal allocation of control rights, and the role of stage¯nancing to mitigate con°icts. This paper is new in that it deals with another much less studied agency con°ict: one that is related to exit issues. The fact that the venture capitalist exits after the R&D stage is the source of distortion.
A paper with ideas closely related to the present paper is the one of BerglÄ of (1994). He argues that if the \right to sell control" (representing the right to decide on the exit route) belongs to the venture capitalist, the entrepreneur will be vulnerable to expropriation of his private bene¯ts in case of a trade sale. In this case, it is optimal to give these control rights (the veto right) to the entrepreneur. It will be shown that this is also in part true in this context. But we will show that the opposite can also be true when these private bene¯ts are very large. In the present paper, by focusing on the two main exit routes we will also provide an explanation for the question of how the venture capitalist gets out of a project. We explicitly model the product market equilibrium outcome to determine pro¯t levels and the premium that the incumbent is willing to pay. This will allow us to derive an endogenously determined exit route based on product market and capital market equilibria.
The second literature area is the one studying the inter-connection between capital markets and product markets (see Maksimovic (1995) for a survey). It points out the disciplinary e®ect of the capital structure (in particular debt as hard claims) on the manager's behavior in the product market. In this paper, we add to these insights the e®ect of venture capital¯nancing and innovation opportunities on both markets. The choice of exit route of the venture capitalist will be based on product market characteristics which in turn a®ects the¯nancial contract between both parties.
IPOs, and only 15% when venture capitalists sell their stake to another company.
Similarly, the¯nancial structure of the venture can also have an important impact on the exit route, since it will determine the potential outcome in the product market through its in°uence on the innovation strategy of the venture. This is a new channel which, we believe, has not been explored yet.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next Section, we present the model. In Section 3, we derive the optimal exit strategy for the venture capitalist. The entire model is then solved for the optimal¯nancing strategy in Section 4. Section 5 extends the benchmark model by including reputation bene¯ts for the venture capitalist. Section 6 deals with contingent control rights allocation.
Section 7 analyzes the e®ect of a shift in bargaining power from the entrepreneur to the venture capitalist. It also discusses the robustness of the main assumptions. Empirical implications and some related evidences are presented in Section 8. Section 9 concludes.
2 The Model
Innovation and Venture Financing
Assume that initially a monopolist, M (also called incumbent), produces a given (indivisible) good with quality level s > 0.
2
Market demand is characterized by a limited number of consumers (normalized to unity) whose marginal utilities µ for quality are uniformly distributed along the segment [µ; µ], and each consumer's utility is U(µ) = µs ¡ P . The variable P denotes the price for the unit purchased. Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good and the reservation value of consumers for buying that unit is set equal to zero.
Consider now an entrepreneur (E ) with zero wealth who is raising funds from a venture capitalist (VC ) to¯nance a project. The entrepreneur is the exclusive owner of the innovative idea behind the project. Both parties are assumed to be risk-neutral. The amount of funds needed is denoted by I > 0 and is exogenously given. The innovation o®ers the opportunity to improve the quality of the incumbent's product.
In case of successful innovation, the newcomer (which is the¯rm that might enter if the entrepreneur is successful in R&D) will be able to produce a related product but with increased quality level s(± + 1), where ±¸0 and 3 ± · ± max´3 µ=(µ ¡ 2µ). We assume that in case two¯rms are present in the market, all the consumers are served by either the incumbent or the newcomer (the so-called covered market assumption). Consumer heterogeneity (which is the di®erence between µ and µ) is assumed to be large enough for two¯rms to coexist (which requires that µ > 2µ > 0).
2 In typical vertical product di®erentiation models, incumbents can choose their quality levels from a segment [s; s], where s is the lowest quality level possible, and s is the upper bound. Here, we consider the limit case in which s = s´s; that is, the 'quality segment' is reduced to a single point. 3 In fact, the analysis could be extended beyond ±max by changing the level of reservation utility of consumers, but limiting ourself to it is su±cient to get all the wanted intuitions, while keeping the analysis tractable. For the mathematical derivation of ± max , cf. Part I in the Appendix. A closer look at the possible range for ± max indicates that it can take any positive value: as consumer heterogeneity increases, ±max goes to zero; when consumers' tastes are more homogeneous (i.e., µ converging to 2µ), ±max goes to in¯nity.
For the sake of simplicity, assume also that the production cost of the good is zero, regardless the quality level.
Innovating allows E to achieve a positive value of ±. By choosing the level of ± he wants to achieve, we assume that the entrepreneur a®ects the expected payo®s in two ways: by increasing ±, (i) the`quality segment' will be longer in case of successful innovation (which will induce higher pro¯ts); and (ii) it will reduce his probability of succeeding. Both components have opposite e®ects on expected pro¯ts. Therefore, ± can be interpreted in two closely related ways: the depth of innovation of the venture, and the risk of its research path (the`technological risk'). While thē rst interpretation stems from the fact that ± determines the quality improvement, the latter comes from the lower probability of success when the entrepreneur is selecting a higher ±. The greater this parameter, the higher the risk, but the greater the return (we will see that return increases with ±).
We therefore consider projects with high ± as being highly innovative and projects with low ± as imitators. This¯ts relatively well to the de¯nition provided by Hellmann and Puri (2000) . They de¯ne an innovator as a \company [that] is either creating a new market, is introducing a radical innovation in an existing market or is developing a technology that will lead to products that satisfy either of the above criteria". Imitators seek their advantage through minor di®erentiation, though there is still some depth of innovation in their product.
The venture's probability of success is denoted by p(±). We assume that p 0 (±) < 0 and p
In what follows, we will restrict ourself to the functional form p(±) = 1=(± + d) 2 with d¸1. We analyze situations in which R&D costs I are such that, in equilibrium,¯nancing the project is pro¯table ex ante. For simplicity, we set the reservation payo® of the entrepreneur to zero and that of the venture capitalist to I ¢ ½ (that is, an expected return on investment of ½¸0). 4 In the benchmark case, we assume perfect competition between venture capitalists so that the participation constraint of VC is always binding.
Private Bene¯ts and Competencies
As Aghion and Tirole (1994) point out, an innovative idea is very often ill-de¯ned. It is not possible to describe it accurately ex ante, or to write enforceable contracts on it. We capture this idea by assuming that the variable ± is observable ex post, but not contractible ex ante. The idea is that it is not possible ex ante to give an exact de¯nition of how the innovation will have to look like, which e®ectively gives E considerable discretionary power on the choice of ±. Typically, he is the one that manages the venture on a day-to-day basis. This contractual incompleteness is assumed throughout the paper since E has full discretion over the research path ±. Combined with the presence of private bene¯ts for E (implied by the implicit contract over control as discussed in the introduction), this 4 The assumption that ¦vc¸I½ only requires a large enough value of s. The same is true for the assumption of covered market in case of entry. The parameter s can be viewed as the degree of value adding of the product. Under this view, high tech products would be characterized by relatively high values of s. This view will be used later to develop some empirical implications of the model (cf. Section 8). High quality products also characterize quite well the type of product innovations that are¯nanced by venture capitalists.
will give rise to an agency con°ict with respect to the optimal choice of ±. It will be shown later that the distortion can occur in either direction, either to a too high or too low choice of ±.
Similarly, exit issues are here assumed to be in the competencies of the venture capitalist; she will be assumed to be the only one able to negotiate e±ciently with potential buyers. This is captured by assuming that VC retains the control rights (throughout this paper, these control rights refer to the right to decide on the choice of exit).
Exit Strategies and Stages of the Game
If she accepts to¯nance the project, VC exits after the R&D stage (ex post, it is more pro¯table for her to sell her shares once the R&D is over and to invest the amount in a new project). We consider the following exit routes:
(1) IPO: the company is listed on a stock market at value ¦(±). Assuming that E remains in the¯rm and is controlling it, he gets non-transferable private bene¯ts of b > 0. We also assume that VC cannot credibly commit himself to¯re E prior to the introduction. We will assume that in an IPO the shares are sold on the stock market to a wide spectrum of investors, with none of them having a controlling stake in the¯rm. The entrepreneur will therefore remain in the company for sure and be free to manage it by his own.
The fact that the technological transfer is incomplete under a TS is a critical assumption. It stipulates that if M acquires the venture, he can only achieve the quality level s(°±+1). If°= 1, the transfer is complete; if°= 0, the transfer is impossible. In-between these two extremes, the transfer is incomplete. 5 Without this ine±ciency of a TS, an IPO as the non-cooperative market outcome would always be suboptimal. Though, we will see that this does not necessarily hold anymore if°< 1; a TS might then become too costly for M.
6
Note that all we need to assume is a relative ine±ciency of a TS compared to an IPO. Another possible interpretation for this ine±ciency is related to the type of assets generated by the entrepreneur. If they are all tangible or if the product is perfectly patentable, then all the innovation 5 Another possible source of ine±ciency is the presence of switching costs for M from changing his technological level from s to s(± + 1). Both types of ine±ciency yield qualitatively similar results. 6 A possible way to reduce such ine±ciency is through a`lock-in' contract that M could o®er to E. Since control rights are retained by M, the entrepreneur will not get any private bene¯ts (these will go to M ). Still, we should expect°< 1 due to possible replacement e®ects (¯xed replacement cost, e.g., through scraping old equipment, or compensating former employees for¯ring them and hiring new ones) and the subsequent agency problems (loss of control) arising from the fact that E is now the agent of M.
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Contract is signed + Investment I is sunk E sets ± Exit + Competition in the product market in providing optimal incentive contracts to the entrepreneur and key employees), organizational ine±ciencies (the negative e®ect for an initially losely structured¯rm that is being integrated into a larger, often more hierarchical (and already well-established) company) and di®erences in managerial culture (start-ups are often told to have their own \culture" and be based on new business models).
The game evolves over 3 stages as depicted in Figure 1 . In stage 1, E o®ers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to VC (allocation of cash°ow rights). If VC accepts the contract, the project is¯nanced and VC invests the amount I. In stage 2, R&D takes place. E chooses ±, the depth of innovation.
In the last stage, the exit decision is made. In the benchmark model, VC retains the \right to sell control" (in what follows, we will refer only to the control rights) so that she can decide on the type of exit. More speci¯cally, she may accept or refuse any o®er made by M for a TS. The pro¯t is paid out according to the¯nancial contract signed in stage 1. The exit value is determined on the basis of a second-price bid auction (the higher value bidder wins at the reservation value of the lower value bidder) between the incumbent M and the¯nancial market, where the latter is perfectly competitive so that it will bid the true value ¦(±) for the venture. It is assumed that M is able to make a take-it-or-leave-it o®er to VC in stage 3. If VC accepts it, a TS takes place; otherwise, the venture gets listed on the stock market. Therefore, M will acquire the venture before it enters the product market if he is ready to pay more than ¦(±) for the venture. Otherwise, the venture gets listed and enters the product market as a competitor of M.
First-Best Outcome and Independence Bias
The purpose of this Section is twofold. First, we determine the optimal exit strategy for the venture as a function of ±; and second, we derive its optimal depth of innovation (Subsection 3.2). In both cases, we will contrast the results with the preferred choice of VC, given that the latter wants to exit in stage 3. In Subsection 3.3, we illustrate the rationale for the possible distortion when E enjoys private bene¯ts from an IPO.
Optimal Exit Decision
If there is no innovation or entry, the monopoly pro¯t of M can be calculated as
The market is then in general uncovered; i.e. not all consumers are served (this result as well as the closed-form pro¯t levels employed later on are all derived in Part I of the Appendix). In case of a successful R&D stage and if the venture remains independent (IPO), the innovation payo® of the entrepreneur's project can be calculated as
¦(±) is the monetary value of the venture in case of entry into the product market determined as the market equilibrium outcome of the vertical product di®erentiation model. Note that ¦(±) is linear with respect to ±. The variable ¹ is a function of all the product market parameters and is used to make notations easier.
Let us¯rst derive the¯rst-best exit decision, which is the case when E does not require any external¯nance or when VC would not want to exit in stage 3. A trade sale occurs if the gain for M from acquiring the entrant (provided he is successful in innovating) is greater than the cost of this acquisition (here, the sum of ¦(±) and the compensation for the entrepreneur's private bene¯ts).
The following condition must therefore be satis¯ed:
The left-hand side represents the maximum o®er M will make in case of innovation. It represents also the gain from acquisition (gross of costs). The right-hand side is the cost of acquisition in the price auction and thus the minimum o®er that M has to make. If this condition holds, the gain for M from acquiring the potential entrant and using himself the enhanced technology will be greater than ¦(±) + b. In this case, M will be able to acquire it by overbidding the market (which will only o®er ¦(±) in case E goes public). Otherwise the venture is better o® by opting for an IPO. Notice that if VC were the one to make the exit choice (she does this in a non-cooperative way), the cost of acquisition for the incumbent would only be ¦(±), since VC would not care about the bene¯ts b.
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It is shown in the Appendix (Part I) that, in case of a TS, M will stop producing his previous quality level s and shifts his entire production to s(°± + 1); i.e., in equilibrium, only one quality will then be produced. Thus, when buying the new entrant, he is in fact only interested in the new technology, since the best strategy is to produce at highest possible quality, which is s(°± + 1).
7 Equation (3) can also be interpreted in another way by simply shifting the second term in the left-hand side to the other side of the inequality. Then the equation says that a trade sale is optimal if monopoly pro¯t is greater than the non-cooperative duopoly outcome (the sum of pro¯ts of M and the new entrant).
-±
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Exit Value
The condition given by equation (3) is satis¯ed for any ± such that
This threshold level is always strictly positive, since the assumption
c , M will therefore make an o®er that overbids the market before any IPO occurs and compensates for b.
8 This is represented in Figure 2 , and is summarized in the¯rst Lemma:
. In a qualityimproving innovation, the¯rst-best exit route is a trade sale if ± < ± 0 c and an IPO if ±¸± 0 c . If the venture capitalist retains the control rights on the exit choice, the threshold value is ± c .
If the technological transfer is complete (°= 1), then ± c > ± max and therefore a TS will always be the most pro¯table exit route for VC. But as°decreases, ± 0 c shifts to the left and makes an IPO more likely to occur. Whenever ± > ± 0 c , a trade sale would destroy value; for ± > ± 0 c , it is the opposite.
Notice that from the point of view of the incumbent, Lemma 1 can also be seen as a choice whether to make a bid or not for the start-up. From the point of view of the venture capitalist although, the choice of the exit route depends on the options she has after the innovation stage and therefore remains a decision variable for the venture capitalist. Since in practice it is her responsibility to look for potential buyers (which is here quite trivial since there is only the incumbent), the venture capitalist faces this choice on the exit route. Furthermore, it is her strategic choice to list or to sell 8 If µ < 2µ, then IPO occurs at any level of ±, since consumer heterogeneity is too small for two¯rms. They cannot di®erentiate themselves enough from each other. The inequality µ < 2µ would imply a Schumpeterian 'creative destruction', independent of the depth of innovation. Notice also that d± 0 c /dµ < 0 and d± 0 c /dµ> 0. Thus, an increase in consumer heterogeneity (either through increase in µ or decrease in µ) implies a lower cut-o® level ± 0 c .
the venture that induces a di®erent product market structure after her exit. The decision whether to accept the o®er of M is still available to VC.
When the venture capitalist decides on exit in the way that it is optimal for her, contract incompleteness combined with the presence of private bene¯ts for E will give rise to a distortion in the choice of ±. For instance, if ± c is greater than the optimal ±, E might want to set the depth of innovation to ± c (thus, taking more risk than what is wanted by VC ) if his bene¯ts b are quite large. This will lower expected pro¯ts but allows E to get b in case of innovation. The same type of reasoning is true when ± c is substantially lower than the \preferred" level of ±. In this case, E will choose a lower ± (but still greater than ± c ) than the one that only maximizes the monetary bene¯ts of the project; this will increase the probability of a successful R&D stage, which is a prerequisite for an IPO and getting the bene¯ts b. Thus, the distortion can occur in either direction. This intuition will be detailed in Subsection 3.3.
In the benchmark case it is assumed that VC will make the exit choice. The correct threshold level will therefore be ± c . In this set-up, the existence of such a threshold level ± c (but also ± 0 c ) stems from two e®ects. The¯rst one is°< 1, and this condition is necessary in any case to get ± c < ± max . This threshold level is decreasing in the ine±ciency in the transfer of technology. The second one is the competition e®ect that is increasing as tastes of consumers get more similar (that is, as µ nears 2µ). ± c decreases as consumer heterogeneity increases, since competition between M and E is reduced. Thus, for given parameters of consumer heterogeneity, there is a level of product di®erentiation above which competition is low enough so that the gain from acquiring the potential entrant is less than the acquisition price ¦(±). After a TS, when setting the price of his new product optimally, M will continue to serve consumers with high µ but now provides them with a qualitatively increased product. In contrast, when letting E enter, he specializes in serving only the consumers with low µ. A business stealing e®ect takes place. Consumers are therefore di®erent for M, depending whether VC exits through a TS or an IPO. And the greater ±, the higher the product di®erentiation, and thus the greater ¦(±). Above some level (that is, for any value greater than ± c ), product di®erentiation is su±ciently high, and the acquisition price ¦(±) exceeds the gain from acquisition. An increase in ± increases product di®erentiation, and thus also weakens competition between¯rms. 9 Furthermore, when E 's private bene¯ts are taken into account, b is another factor a®ecting the threshold (in this case ± 0 c ). 9 The existence of such a threshold level is not unique to this model. It does also exist under Cournot quantity competition; e.g., with linear (inverse) demand P (q1; q2) = a ¡ q1 ¡ q2, the incumbent producing q1 at constant marginal cost c and the new entrepreneur (with production level q 2 ) having the opportunity to enter the market at lower constant marginal cost c ¢ (1 ¡¯), where 0 ·¯· 1. The depth of innovation then increases in¯. Again, we need to assume some ine±ciency through TS; e.g., a marginal cost of c ¢ (1 ¡°¯) for the acquirer, where°is de¯ned as above. A similar result can also be derived for innovations that reduce¯xed costs instead of marginal costs. Thus, this analysis is not limited to product innovation but can also be extended to so-called process innovations that a®ect the cost of production.
First-Best Depth of Innovation
Before solving this game, let us compute the preferred outcome for VC. Since VC does not get any private bene¯ts from¯nancing the project, the depth of innovation maximizes at the same time the purely monetary bene¯ts of the project. In what follows next, this outcome will stand for one of the benchmark results. It is the level of ± that is not distorted by the private non-monetary bene¯ts of the entrepreneur.
Solving the following maximization problem
yields the following¯rst-order condition:
Recall that p(±) = 1=(± + d) 2 . Thus, denoting the level of ± that maximizes only the monetary bene¯ts of the venture by ± vc , we get ± vc = d. In this case, it is independent of any characteristics of the product market 10 (these characteristics are all summarized in the parameter ¹, which depends on all the product market variables µ, µ and s). But, since the parameter d determines this depth of innovation, d is an indicator of the project's ex post pro¯tability. The higher the probability parameter d, the greater the optimal innovation payo® (but also the riskier the project).
Furthermore, when taking into account the private bene¯ts b of the entrepreneur, we have the following maximization problem:
This yields the¯rst-best outcome for the venture under an IPO (the one that maximizes joint pro¯ts of VC and E ), denoted by ± e . We get
Notice that this¯rst-best is always achieved under an IPO when E is¯nancially unconstrained.
In fact, ± e is the¯rst-best that maximizes expected joint pro¯ts of VC and E. It is also achieved when VC opts for an IPO irrespective of the level of ±. When the venture capital industry is competitive, this outcome provides E with the optimal trade-o® between pro¯ts and non-monetary private bene¯ts, and thus is decreasing with the level of private bene¯ts b and increasing in ¹. Later on, we will see that even if VC is put on her participation constraint, ± e will not always be achieved;
in some cases, E will decide to distort the depth of innovation to avoid that the incumbent makes a better o®er.
We summarize these results in the next Lemma.
Lemma 2 The¯rst-best depth of innovation is given by ± e = d ¡ 2b=¹; the one that maximizes the monetary bene¯ts only is ± vc = d. While VC will prefer ± vc if she had bargaining power, the entrepreneur will opt for ± e whenever it is optimal. Their preferences with respect to ± are aligned only if either b = 0 or E has the incentive to choose some ± < ± c (since then B(±) = 0). Only in this case there will be no agency problem and the depth of innovation will be set to ± vc .
Distortion in the Depth of Innovation
When the venture capitalist decides on exit, recall that E only enjoys private bene¯ts if ±¸± c .
Thus, setting the depth of innovation to ± e is only optimal if ± e¸±c . If this is not the case, the entrepreneur has incentives to distort the depth of innovation and to set it to ± c . Figure 3 shows that three di®erent cases need to be considered separately. The level ± c can be situated either left to ± e (Case A), between ± e and ± (Case B), or right to ± (Case C).
In Case A, E is getting b for sure if he is successful. ± e is therefore optimal. In Case B, it is not worth choosing ± e , since it would not lead to an IPO anymore. Thus, E will set the depth of innovation to the corner solution ± c ; this is the lowest level of ± for which he can still remain independent in case of successful R&D. In Case C, the threshold level ± c is so high that E will have to take too much risk to remain independent. Here the entrepreneur is ready to give up his willingness to stay independent, and chooses the level ± vc , which is the one that maximizes only the monetary payo®s of the venture. Distorting the depth of innovation costs more than the expected gains from the private bene¯ts; he will only distort if the loss in expected monetary pro¯ts from distorting is lower than the expected value of his private bene¯ts at ± c ; that is,
This is more likely to occur when b is not too important, since he will require a lower compensation.
This yields the following condition:
The likelihood for an IPO therefore increases with the private bene¯ts of the entrepreneur (the amount b), the technological \riskiness" of the project (related to the variable d), but decreases with the degree of value-adding s. The next Proposition summarizes these¯ndings on the depth of innovation as a function of ± c .
Proposition 3
The entrepreneur will choose the following levels of innovation depth which di®er from the¯rst-best values:
(Case C)
Proof: see discussion above. ± is derived in a later Proposition.
Analysis of the Benchmark Case
Our benchmark case is the one in which the venture capitalist retains control rights. We capture this by assuming that the entrepreneur is not competent enough to negotiate with potential buyers, and therefore exit issues are at the discretion of the venture capitalist (in the same sense as the entrepreneur's competencies on the choice of ±). 11 This will lead to ± c as threshold value for the exit decision in stage 3. We further assume that the venture capital industry is perfectly competitive, which is captured by the assumption that E is making the take-it-or-leave-it o®er to VC in stage 1 and VC 's pro¯t is driven down to the reservation rate I½. Under these circumstances, E will be able to design the contract in such a way to induce ± e whenever it is optimal to do so. The¯nancial contract will be such that VC just breaks even (¦ vc = I ¢ ½) and, at the same time, it induces the optimal choice of ± from the point of view of the entrepreneur.
In the next Subsection, we derive the optimal¯nancing strategy using standard debt and equity.
In Subsection 4.2, we derive and discuss some optimality results in terms of security design. It is also shown that standard debt-equity contracts are optimal in this setting. As in the usual fashion, the game is solved by backward induction.
Debt and Equity Contracts
The contract between VC and E will include the allocation of cash°ow rights, which are characterized by the variables ® (for equity) and D (for debt payment or preferred stocks issued to VC ).
12
These are set in stage 1 of the game. As in Hellmann (1998), we separate control rights from cash°o w rights. In the benchmark case, VC will hold the \right to sell control" (as part of the control rights); this determines who bargains with M (the potential buyer) and, consequently, who decides 11 The case where E holds the control rights to decide the exit route is discussed in a later Section. It will be assumed that the entrepreneur cannot achieve the same exit value as the venture capitalist by some arbitrary amount C > 0. 12 Alternatively, any mix of debt and equity can be achieved by issuing participating preferred equity to the venture capitalist.
on the type of exit route if innovation is successful. This is the same de¯nition as in BerglÄ of (1994).
Thus, in the benchmark case VC will decide on the type of exit. Alternative allocations of control rights will be examined in a later Section. Furthermore, we exclude the possibility that contracts can be made contingent on the exit route; this will be discussed in a later section on robustness (we argue there that VC will not want to limit her exit options to an IPO in order to keep the threat of a TS; this aims to guarantee the cooperation of E at the exit stage).
Denote the private bene¯ts of the entrepreneur by B = b > 0 if he is staying independent from M (i.e., in case of going public), and B = 0 otherwise. For standard debt and equity contracts, the expected pro¯ts of VC and E are given by
with ¦(±) representing the ex post pro¯t of the venture (see equation (2)) in case of successful innovation. ¦(±) also represents the exit value of the venture. In the following, we will also refer to it as the innovation payo®. The variable D represents debt payment from the successful entrepreneur to the venture capitalist. 13 Since debt has seniority rights over equity, it is paid out¯rst. The variable IPO. In this case, a TS occurs and pro¯ts (gross of investment costs I for VC ) are as follows
And if ±¸± c , the company is introduced on the stock market, yielding
with two¯rms now supplying the market; M producing at quality level s, and E at level s(± + 1). (ii) The Second Stage In this stage, E sets ±. To understand E 's choice, assume for the moment that an IPO is the only allowed exit route. Then, for given values of ® and D the entrepreneur will set ± as follows:
Equation (12) is the¯rst-order condition with respect to ± and says that including some debt increases the optimal choice of ± by generating hard claims for the entrepreneur in case of success.
This shifts the distribution of pro¯ts to the right. On the other hand, issuing more equity (i.e., decreasing ®) has the opposite e®ect on ±, since it reduces the portion of monetary bene¯ts he will get in case of innovation; he will therefore put less weight on monetary pro¯ts. For a pure equity contract (D = 0), ± ¤ < ± e . The reason is that a wealth constrained E will choose a depth of innovation that is lower than his¯rst-best to increase the probability of being successful, and thus to start up his own¯rm. In any case, he will trade-o® his monetary gains with his private bene¯ts. The higher b, the less risky the research path he will choose. By introducing debt (D > 0), E is forced to put more weight on the monetary bene¯ts of the venture. Like in Hart and Moore (1995), debt creates hard claims, which constrains E to increase monetary pro¯ts. It therefore reduces the e®ect of b. Equation (12) shows that a pure equity contract would result in a risk-taking behavior of E below ± vc and ± e ; in contrast, pure debt¯nancing generates a riskier R&D strategy than ± vc . Too much debt may cause an overreaction by E. In this case, relying on a single security will therefore lead to a suboptimal outcome as soon as the entrepreneur gets private bene¯ts. Furthermore, without such private bene¯ts only pure equity contracts are optimal.
In order to make ± e the optimal choice of E, the contract needs to be designed in such a way that ± ¤ = ± e . 14 It is straightforward to check that the constraint on D and ® is as follows:
If this condition is feasible, E can achieve his¯rst-best ± e by issuing both securities, debt and equity.
Feasibility requires that, in equilibrium, D · ¦(± e ) and thus sets an upper bound to the level of private bene¯ts b.
Now we solve when a TS is possible; the incumbent can then make an o®er to acquire the new company. Then, the threshold value ± c does matter. Again, three di®erent cases need to be considered separately. The level ± c can be situated either left to ± e (Case A), between ± e and ± (Case B), or right to ± (Case C).
14 The reason for this equality can be seen when solving the¯rst stage, which entails the following maximization problem:
where the expected payo®s of the entrepreneur is the same as
where the latter term is simply equal to I(1 + ½). The maximization problem can therefore be rewritten as
Thus, the entrepreneur will have to choose the capital structure that achieves ± ¤ (®; D) = ±e.
In Case A, E is getting b for sure if he is successful. ± e is therefore optimal and is achieved under the¯nancial constraint given by equation (13) . E can therefore implement his preferred outcome.
In Case B, it is not worth choosing ± e , since it would not lead to an IPO anymore. Thus, E will set the depth of innovation to the corner solution ± c ; this is the lowest level of ± for which he can still remain independent in case of successful R&D. 15 In Case C, the threshold level is again too high so that E will have to take too much risk to remain independent. He will therefore maximize monetary bene¯ts only and choose ± vc .
(iii) The First Stage In this stage, E decides on the debt level D and the equity sharing rule ® that will be included in the contract. A key issue is the type of¯nancing E will prefer (either debt or equity, or some mix). In any case the repayment amount is I(1 + ½)=p(±). This is derived from the binding participation constraint of VC :
In summary, we can conclude that it is important for the venture capitalist to take into account this possible distortion when considering her decision to¯nance the venture. The presence of private bene¯ts for the entrepreneur can be an important source of distortion. The optimal contract largely depends on the value of ± c compared to ± e and ±.
The next Proposition summarizes the results of this Section in terms of exit strategy.
Proposition 4 Under venture capital¯nancing, an IPO occurs in equlibrium if
otherwise, the venture capitalist will exit through a trade sale.
Proof: We need to consider the limit between Cases B and C; that is, an IPO occurs i® ¦ e (± c )¸¦ e (± vc ), where ± vc = d (cf. Lemma 2). This implies two roots for ± c : d § 2 p db=¹.
Since ³ d ¡ 2 p db=¹´does not apply for the limit between Cases B and C, we have that an IPO occurs whenever
The likelihood for an IPO therefore increases with the private bene¯ts of the entrepreneur (b), consumer heterogeneity (di®erence µ ¡ µ), riskiness of the project (d), but decreases with s. As discussed in the previous Section, no distortion in monetary bene¯ts takes place only when ± c is very large so that the additional expected pro¯ts are at least as large as the expected private bene¯ts of E :
This comes from the condition ¦ e (± vc )¸¦ e (± c ). Then, E chooses ± vc and VC exits through a TS.
The right-hand side of equation (15) is increasing in b. This makes the requirement for this inequality more di±cult to be met. Thus, the higher the private bene¯ts b, the more costly the 15 In principle, some debt can be issued, since E will choose ±c in this con¯guration. But there is an upper bound for the debt level which is given by the condition ± ¤ = ±c. This allows the entrepreneur to issue debt up to the following
Otherwise, E will overreact and choose a depth of innovation that is above ±c.
compensation for avoiding the distortion on ±. This, in turn, makes a TS less likely, since the entrepreneur might not be compensated anymore.
Proposition 4 rea±rms the result stated earlier that signi¯cant product innovations are most likely to lead to publicly-held¯rms, while imitator projects (those with low ± due to a low value of d) tend to be sold by VC to an existing¯rm as the gain from acquisition outweighs the value of the venture as soon as the degree of product di®erentiation chosen by E is by far below ± c . The term 2 p db=¹ represents the e®ect of the distortion from an ex ante point of view.
Interestingly, the presence of a positive b can generate a shift in ± either in the one or the other direction. If ± e > ± c , then an increase in b induces a reduction in ± away from ± vc . And if ± e < ± c , the presence of such bene¯ts can generate a shift from ± vc to ± c if the entrepreneur is not compensated for his private bene¯ts.
Furthermore, an increase in b has two di®erent e®ects on expected pro¯ts: (i) a direct e®ect for E in case of an IPO; and (ii) an indirect e®ect (if ± e is optimal) through the lower ® o®ered to VC, which is induced by the decrease in the depth of innovation. E is gaining from an increase in b in all the cases, either directly or indirectly (or both).
Recall that ± 
Optimality of Debt and Equity
Before stating some results on contract optimality, let us cite again some de¯nitions and intermediate results in order to better understand what makes the choice of debt and equity. In case of innovation, the total repayment of the entrepreneur to VC is the sum of debt payment D and private equity
In the benchmark case, the venture capitalist is always put on her participation constraint. Recall also that the entrepreneur's aim is to achieve ± e = d¡2b=¹ whenever it is optimal for him; and for a given¯nancial structure, for ± e¸±c his decision rule is
Combined with the participation constraint of VC, this yields a unique¯nancial structure (Proposition 6). Recall that ± c is small when consumer heterogeneity is large or the ine±ciency from the transfer of technology is important.
The following Proposition states an optimal security design for Case-A projects (leading to highly innovative projects compared to ± c ):
Proposition 6 For ± e¸±c (no distortion takes place), there exists a unique optimal¯nancial contract which is a combination of debt (D e ) and equity (® e ):
The¯rst equation of the Proposition says that the proportion b=[p(b+¦)¡I(1+½)] of repayments will be debt. Since¯nancial markets are perfectly competitive, equity is the rest; that is, the following condition must hold:
. This yields ® e as presented in Proposition 6. Imposing a proportion
of debt ensures that E will want to choose ± e in stage 2 and, in the same time, ® e is set in such a way that VC 's participation constraint is binding.
Since VC is put on her participation constraint at any time, standard debt-equity contracts described in this Proposition are always optimal. In any other case (i.e., whenever ± e < ± c ), thē nancial structure is not unique (but, as mentioned in a previous footnote, there is an upper limit in the amount of debt that should be contracted). Notice although that the¯nancial structure is not always irrelevant in the absence of private bene¯ts for the entrepreneur. Whenever ± e¸±c , the issuance of debt always provides incentives to take more risk (cf. equation (12)).
BerglÄ of (1994) shows how control rights can be allocated using standard securities such as pure equity, convertible preferred equity, debt and convertible debt. Here, we have shown that the use of a particular type of securities is also driven by the aim to provide optimal incentives to the entrepreneur and that it can a®ect the equilibrium level of innovation. A¯rst way to allocate control rights is by writing explicitly in the contract which party has the power to decide alone on exit issues. This was in fact how its allocation has been modelled here; it provides an explicit intervention right to the venture capitalist. In practice, this can be implemented through explicit veto rights combined with \go along (or tag along)" or \piggyback" rights (cf. e.g., Sahlman (1990)) and along with convertible securities (Kaplan and StrÄ omberg (1999) show that such securities are widely used in venture capital¯nancing). In addition, venture capitalists often include a \liquidity clause (call options)" in the contract that allows them to buy from the entrepreneur a signi¯cant amount of his shares; this allows them to increase the equity stake and thus to increase the chance to do a trade sale (which is more di±cult to do if the venture capitalist only holds a very small equity stake, since acquirers typically want to buy a large stake to be sure to take control over the company). 17 
Reputation Bene¯ts for the Venture Capitalist
In this Section, we extend the model by including reputation gains for VC from a successful IPO and see how it a®ects the outcome. We show that the distortion is similar as for the private bene¯ts of the entrepreneur. This reputation bene¯t may stem from the popularity/publicity that the venture capitalist enjoys through a successful public listing.
In the following, assume the venture capitalist enjoys reputation bene¯ts from an IPO; let us denote by R¸0 the reputation gain for VC. We also assume that I½¸p(±) ¢ R to ensure that monetary bene¯ts are still positive ex post. 18 We also assume that the incumbent can make side payments to VC to compensate for the non-monetary bene¯ts. Thus, he needs to pay the total amount of ¦(±) + R to acquire all the shares. When R > 0, VC 's preferred depth of innovation under an IPO is:
To achieve this depth of innovation, the¯nancial contract would need to satisfy the following con-
. This is the case whenever:
Thus, whenever R > 0, the amount of debt issued needs to be higher in order to induce this lower depth of innovation.
17 Cf. Bartlett (1999) for a detailed presentation of these¯nancial clauses. 18 This simply says that the required monetary gain must be greater that the expected reputation gain for VC so that shareholders of the venture capital fund (the external investors) still gets a positive expected pro¯t from the fund. 19 The¯rst-best depth of innovation is: d ¡
2(b+R) ¹
. This could be achieved i®
Notice that the existence of reputation gain for VC also a®ects the threshold level for which VC will be indi®erent between an IPO and a TS; this level is now equal to Proof: see above discussion.
The reason is the following. There is no real certi¯cation e®ect, but rather the reputation e®ect plays the same role as private bene¯ts for the entrepreneur. When R > 0, it is aligned with the entrepreneur's incentives induced by his private bene¯ts b.
Though, the¯rst-best is not achieved; the¯rst-best threshold level is equal to 
Contingent Control Rights Allocation
In this Section, we analyze what happens when both parties include the \right to sell control" as additional degree of freedom into the contract. Recall that this right determines who is allowed to decide on exit issues. In the previous Sections, it was retained by the venture capitalist and it was assumed that she is the most competent person for this choice. As we will see, giving this right to the entrepreneur will allow to extract a premium from the buyer under a TS that compensates for his private bene¯ts. Here, we analyze the conditions under which it is more e±cient to allocate these rights to the entrepreneur. This will allow him to bargain with M in stage 3. In other words, M will be making the take-it-or-leave-it o®er to E (instead of to VC ) who, in turn, may accept it or refuse it. Again, if the o®er is accepted, a TS takes place; otherwise, the venture goes public with exit value ¦(±).
If E is retaining the control rights to decide on exit, a TS will only take place if M is ready to Since the venture capitalist is the most competent in making deals (her competencies in¯nancial engineering), there is a cost for the entrepreneur if he decides to retain control rights on the exit route; the discount will be denoted by C¸0 and assumed a¯xed amount. This cost should be understood as relative disadvantage compared to the competency of VC. 20 Thus, the new threshold level of ± that determines the optimal type of exit is
The following Proposition summarizes the results in terms of optimal allocation of control rights.
Proposition 8 (i) Let b > C. Then, giving the control rights to the entrepreneur lowers the threshold level to ± 00 c . It is optimal to give him control rights if ± · ± 00 c . For any ± between ± 00 c and ± c , the entrepreneur opts for an IPO, while the venture capitalist wants to sell the venture to the incumbent.
For any ±¸± 00 c , control rights should be allocated to the venture capitalist. (ii) If b · C, it is always optimal to allocate control rights to the venture capitalist.
Within the critical interval [± 00 c ; ± c ], unanimity on the exit route cannot be achieved. If E retained the control rights, exit would occur through an IPO; in case VC retained these rights, exit would also be through an IPO but at depth of innovation of ± c . Thus, allocating the right to sell control to the entrepreneur would lead to the same exit route but at di®erent levels of innovation. It is higher when the venture capitalist retained this right.
It provides a possible explanation for the observation of Hellmann and Puri (2000) that more innovative¯rms (assume ± exogenously given) are more likely to get venture capital. Since entrepreneurs of less innovative companies retain control rights, the role of venture capitalist is passive, while the latter can add value for more innovative projects by bringing in their competencies in doing deals (i.e., by holding these control rights on exit).
Robustness of the Model

Market Power of Venture Capitalist
In contrast to a lot of other projects that need to be funded, venture-backed projects typically exhibit high information asymmetry so that entrepreneurs usually face an imperfectly competitive venture capital supply, since the latter need themselves to be highly specialized (either in few industries and/or¯nancing stages) to get a comparative advantage over other types of¯nancial intermediaries.
This provides in reality the venture capitalists with important bargaining power. Only if the supply of venture capital funds continues to increase in the same way as in the last few years that we could expect in the near future a complete shift in bargaining power in favor of entrepreneurs. 20 Notice that costs C only occurs for the exit of VC ; otherwise, E can hold his shares if he funds his own project (which increases his outside option in case of TS). These costs can also be seen as underpricing due to recognition of outside investors of the passivity of VC (underpricing is avoided when VC holds control rights because of her reputation/certi¯cation). Thus, this Section can also be seen as an analysis of active vs. passive VC s. Active involvement of VC adds value by avoiding costs C (this Section shows the impact of her active involvement).
In this Subsection, we investigate to which extent the previous results relied on the imposed assumptions of bargaining power. In particular, in reality the venture capitalist still has important bargaining power vis-µ a-vis the entrepreneur. Here, we assume that she has all the bargaining power.
This opposite assumption might also be rather exaggerated; the reality probably lies somewhere between these two extremes.
Consider¯rst the case where VC gives no monetary payo® to E. If VC decided to set ® = 0 and D = 0, E 's best strategy is to choose ± c . This gives the minimum expected pro¯t of E in any case.
In this way, he may still get bene¯ts of b in case of successful innovation. To avoid this, VC has to set ® and D in such a way that the entrepreneur is at least compensated for his deviation payo® equal to p(± c ) ¢ b. In what follows, we will refer to this minimum expected payo® as the`deviation payo®' of the entrepreneur. Whenever VC is making a take-it-or-leave-it o®er to E in stage 1, she will have to compensate the entrepreneur for this amount if she wants to induce another level of innovation. Otherwise, he will choose ± c for sure.
Under these circumstances, the outcome of the third stage is as described in Lemma 1 with ± c as threshold level. In stage 2, VC will try to induce ± vc = d, which does not take into account the non-monetary bene¯ts of E. Recall that the optimal choice of ± for given values of D and ® are determined by E in stage 2 and, for ±¸± c , according to the rule provided by equation (12) .
For standard debt and equity contracts, we establish the following optimal¯nancing strategy with the corresponding exit route:
Proposition 9 For ± vc > ± c , the optimal exit route is an IPO with the following contract:
For ± vc · ± c , exit occurs through a trade sale whenever ± c > e ±; i.e., the entrepreneur is compensated for giving up the¯rm. Otherwise (i.e., for ± c · e ±), an IPO takes place with ® = D = 0; where
and
Again, the moral hazard problem increases with the size of b. An increase in b again has two di®erent e®ects on expected pro¯ts: (i) a direct e®ect for E in case of an IPO; and (ii) if ±¸± c , an indirect e®ect through ® o®ered by VC, which then a®ects both parties. It is possible to show that E is gaining from an increase in b in all the cases, either directly or indirectly (or both). On the other hand, VC is indi®erent with respect to a marginal change in b in case of an IPO. In case of a TS, VC is worse o®, since she needs to give E more shares (d® o /db > 0) while the depth of innovation is not a®ected (remains at ± vc ). But in contrast to the setting in Section 4, VC now has a control device from her market power. Whenever ± vc > ± c , she is able to induce ± vc by using a speci¯c combination of debt and equity as described in Proposition 9.
A consequence of a shift in bargaining power in favor of E (as in the previous Sections) is that the¯rst-best level of innovation (± e ) is expected to be implemented more often for highly innovative projects. This is because VC loses the power to control the choice of ± through the optimal setting of ® and D. VC has virtually no control anymore to a®ect the R&D strategy of E. But as long as this shift in bargaining power has not yet occurred, VC can in°uence the entrepreneur's decision through the variables D and ®, whenever ± vc¸±c . For ± vc < ± c , VC must accept either a distortion in ± or a monetary incentive payment. Only in the latter case does exit occur through a TS.
The next Proposition states the optimal¯nancing strategy using a more general class of contracts:
Proposition 10 For ± vc > ± c , from the point of view of the venture capitalist, the standard debtequity contract described in Proposition 9 is optimal. For ± vc · ± c , the optimal contract is a nonlinear equity contract with
Furthermore, the value of ± c for which VC is indi®erent between a TS and an IPO is as in Proposition 4; that is, M will make an o®er to buy the newcomer's technology if
and let E enter the market otherwise. 21 This does not alter the previous analysis, though in the optimal contract ® o is replaced by ® p . This will bene¯t VC, while E will lose.
The suboptimality of linear contracts may get very large as ± c is near ± vc . Denote the ratio (® o =® p ) by ª. Then (recall that this is only valid when ± c¸d ):
with ª decreasing in ± c and increasing in d. Thus, VC is more likely to compensate E for his private bene¯t and avoiding the distortion in ±, when she contracts on ¦. Furthermore, the di®erence between ® o and ® p is more likely to be great for more innovative projects (high d). But E is in overall worse o®, since his expected compensation is lower.
Finally, when the entrepreneur retains control rights, an important di®erence is that the expected \deviation payo®" of the entrepreneur is now p(0)b; i.e., E will set ± = 0 if he is expecting no monetary bene¯t from a successful innovation but retaining the right to sell. In equilibrium, a TS occurs whenever the entrepreneur sets the depth of innovation below ± 00 c .
Contracts Conditioned on Exit Route
One could claim that it is possible to achieve the¯rst-best outcome by imposing in the contract an IPO as unique exit route if ± e < ± c (in all the other cases, this is irrelevant since both parties agree on the IPO). In this case, E would expect private bene¯ts for sure so that he chooses ± e as in the 21 In Proposition 9, this critical value was denoted by a. For standard debt-equity contracts, a > d + 2 p bd=¹.
¯rst-best. Although this is not explicitely modeled in this paper, this reasoning can be misleading as far as the venture capitalist typically needs the co-operation fo the entrepreneur to make a sucessful IPO. Whenever E does not care about exit (for which he typically needs to do some e®ort), VC may not be able to exit properly. Thus, VC will not want to be locked-in by committing in advance on some exit route due to possible opportunistic behavior of E. By leaving open the threat of a TS ex ante (i.e., when not conditioning the VC 's gains on an IPO), it forces the entrepreneur to co-operate at the exit stage. This should therefore provide a rationale for why in practice venture capitalists wish to retain substantial control rights regarding exit and not to commit in advance to an IPO.
Furthermore, it is not sensible to condition payments on some realized exit value ¦(± e ) (or some lower bound) in addition to a speci¯c exit route, since once the contract signed the entrepreneur has incentives to deviate and choose some depth of innovation slightly lower to make an IPO at that price impossible. Thus, no venture capitalist will accept such a contract. The same argument applies when the venture capitalist's compensation is contingent on a TS with price ¦(± e ) + b; the entrepreneur again has incentives to deviate by choosing a slightly lower depth of innovation than the one implied by the predetermined price. We therefore conclude that it is not useful to condition payments of the venture capitalist on exit routes and/or exit price if ± is non-contractible.
Another important issue is the assumption regarding the possible acquisition of control by M when buying all the shares of the venture in an IPO. Throughout the paper, we assumed that this was not possible since the proportion held by the entrepreneur was large enough to avoid transfer of control under an IPO (recall that under a TS the venture capitalist can force the entrepreneur to sell his shares too so that a transfer of control to M was then possible). In this alternative scenario, E would not get his private bene¯ts anymore although the company is publicly listed. Thus, there is no use either to limit exit options of VC to an IPO. 22 In this case, the analysis would remain similar and the agency problem would not vanish, since E would lose control over the¯rm in any case whenever he choses a depth of innovation less than ± c . Thus, he would always want to distort ± whenever ± e · ± c · ± (which is the relevant Case B in Proposition 3). The analysis of the agency con°ict is therefore similar to the one presented in this paper (except for Section 5).
Empirical Implications
Some topics on exit of venture capitalists have already been studied empirically, like issues on IPO underpricing (e.g., Barry, Muscarella et al. (1990) ) and the certi¯cation e®ect for venture-backed
IPOs (e.g., Megginson and Weiss (1991) ). 23 Kaplan and StrÄ omberg (1999) studied the importance of ownership for explaining the observed interaction between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur.
They provide empirical evidence that venture capitalists retain important intervention rights to protect herself against possible opportunistic behavior of entrepreneurs. 22 In principle, it is su±cient that there is a positive probability that the incumbent acquires control so that the entrepreneur will again distort the depth of innovation. Then, we do not achieve the¯rst-best anymore. 23 A more detailed survey of empirical¯ndings on exit issues is provided by Gompers and Lerner (1999) .
The choice of the venture capitalist between a trade sale and an IPO has not gained much attention yet. This is also true for the e®ect of product market characteristics on venture capital nancing. One interesting empirical paper that aimed to create such a link is the one by Hellmann and Puri (2000) . They¯nd that more innovative¯rms are more likely to be¯nanced by venture capital, 24 and that the e®ect of this type of¯nancing on \time-to-market" is strongest for innovativē rms. In other words, venture-backed companies tend to go faster to market than others, particularly if they are innovators. The speed of innovation is particularly important for high tech start-ups.
In this Section, we state empirical implications arising out of the independence bias studies in this paper. We present them in form of hypotheses that could possibly be tested; this Section is therefore intended to provide material for further empirical research. We present some hypotheses on innovation depth and product market structure as well as on other issues derived from the studies framework. One of these hypotheses will be illustrated using UK data.
H1:
The depth of innovation of a venture is positively correlated with its likelihood to go public.
This hypothesis is summarized in Lemma 1 and can be observed as ex post outcome. It must be recognized that there is no exact measure for the depth of innovation. But Hellmann and Puri (2000) used an interview-based method to approximate this variable. Based on answers by their respondents, they classi¯ed all their ventures in either innovator or imitator. H1 would then imply that innovative ventures are more likely to go public than for imitator projects. But still, problems of¯nding a fully reliable proxy for the depth of innovation remain, since it is hardly quanti¯able.
A possible way to test Lemma 1 is to relate the depth of innovation to pro¯tability:
H2:
The return on venture capital investments is positively correlated with the decision to go public.
This hypothesis stems from the fact that in our model, the value of the venture is also innovation driven. Greater innovation implies higher pro¯ts (cf. equation (2)). Pro¯ts can therefore be used as a proxy for innovation depth.
The company's price-to-earnings ratio should be broadly consistent with pro¯tability in the sense used in our framework. In this case, we would expect the likelihood to go public to be positively a®ected by an increase in the price-to-earnings ratio. industries. Only these four were represented in the data set that we have obtained.
Cumming and MacIntosh (2000) used the market-to-book value to test a qualitatively similar hypothesis (although based on an adverse selection argument) on a data set of US and Canadian ventures. They also come to the same conclusion; that is, an IPO is the preferred exit route for venture capitalists for their most pro¯table companies. Gompers (1995) also report that US venture capitalists earn an average annual rate of return of 60% when they exit through an IPO, as compared to 15% for trade sales.
H3: Distortions in the innovation strategy are less likely in high tech industries than \low tech"
industries.
This hypothesis is related to the parameter s. Note that this hypothesis is not implied by H1
and H2, which were related to the parameter ±. It determines the initial quality level and therefore may be a proxy to the value-adding, since it increases the product market pro¯ts. Thus, high tech industries should be characterized by high values of s. The fact that it reduces the distortion stems from the fact that high tech industries imply higher pro¯ts, which in turn makes the entrepreneur put more weight on monetary incentive returns than his private bene¯ts.
The size of distortion can be proxied by the likelihood to go public (since a greater distortion implies a higher likelihood for an IPO). Another possibility is to relate excessive distortion with the relative volatility of projects, which is then expected to be higher for \low tech".
H4:
The likelihood to go public increases with the number of incumbents in the product market.
This is shown in the Appendix (Part II). For a given depth of innovation, the gain from a trade sale between the incumbent and the newly created company stems from the fact that the incumbent bene¯ts from the acquisition by remaining a monopolist instead of being in a duopoly situation. Under price competition like in our framework, if there are more than two incumbents already in the market the acquirer cannot gain anymore from the reduced competition implied by the acquisition. In fact, acquiring the new entrant does not allow to weaken the competitive e®ect so that entry of the new¯rm (the venture) is more likely. Therefore, no incumbent will have the incentive to overbid the market (i.e., to o®er more than ¦). This also applies for markets in which rms are free to enter at the incumbent's quality level s. In the Appendix, it is also shown that this also holds in presence of the exit-related agency problem as discussed previously in this paper.
Thus, empirical work should take into account the e®ect of ex ante product market concentration.
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H5: The likelihood to go public increases with private bene¯ts of the entrepreneur and reputation bene¯ts of the venture capitalist.
An increase in private bene¯ts for the entrepreneur increases the gain in monetary pro¯ts that must be achieved through a trade sale; this makes an IPO more likely (the condition for an IPO was given in Proposition 4). As argued in Section 5, the existence of reputation bene¯ts for the venture capitalist has similar e®ects to the entrepreneur's private bene¯ts. For evaluating control bene¯ts of managers, see e.g. Dyck and Zingales (2002) for an extensive survey and empirical evidence on such bene¯ts.
H6:
The likelihood to go public increases with the degree of asset intangibility of the innovation.
It should be recalled the meaning of the asset intangibility. Here, intangibility implies ine±ciency in the transfer of technology (i.e., it lowers°) and thus represents a loss for the acquirer. It therefore is arising from the inalienability of the entrepreneurial team and not from the possible di®usion of information under an IPO (which requires more openness of the companies' plans vis-µ a-vis outside investors and competitors).
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to incorporate product market characteristics and the depth of innovation into the analysis of exit decision, and take them into account in the¯nancial contracting between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. It is¯rst shown that an IPO can be more pro¯table than a trade sale when the new product is su±ciently innovative. This implies that highly innovative and pro¯table ventures are more likely to go public than for imitator projects. The model presented in this paper therefore provides a possible explanation for why in reality we¯nd both types of exit route. Furthermore, a greater consumer heterogeneity lowers the threshold level of innovation for an IPO to occur. This provides theoretical support to the more general observations of Hellmann and Puri (2000) that product market characteristics do matter in venture capital contracting.
27 Notice although that under these assumptions, we would expect an IPO for sure when the innovative product also leads to a new market (n = 0). Cf. Appendix. This should be particularly important for the analysis of \high tech" product like in H3, since these products are probably more likely to create new markets (though this is an empirical issue and can therefore not be considered here).
The decision about the exit route can induce an agency problem when the entrepreneur is getting non-transferable private bene¯ts from staying independent after the R&D stage. This agency problem stems from the implicit contracts inherent in the venture capitalist's option to list the company. In this analysis, this induced the entrepreneur to try to di®erentiate more his product from the existing competitor than what would be optimal from a pure pro¯t maximizing point of view.
Reputation gains for venture capitalists from an IPO have qualitatively similar e®ects. Furthermore, transferring the \right to sell control" to the entrepreneur can increase the exit value of the venture if exit occurs through a trade sale. This e®ect is increased with the level of private bene¯ts. Finally, the model allows to state di®erent empirical implications to provide material for further empirical research.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature that links product market and capital market together. It analyses some particularities of the venture capital market (namely the exit of the venture capitalist and its¯nancing). The fact that the venture capitalist wants to sell her shares after the R&D stage may generate a distortion and thus a®ects the optimal product market structure.
A Appendix
Part I: Product Market Outcomes
We compute three di®erent outcomes: (1) pro¯t of M prior to innovation (or if R&D is unsuccessful); (2) pro¯t of M in case of a TS; and (3) pro¯ts of M and E in case of an IPO. Solving the two last cases allows to derive the exit condition expressed by equation (3).
(1) Prior to any innovation (or if R&D is unsuccessful), the incumbent M faces the following maximization problem:
with µ c = P=s and, by construction, µ c¸µ . This yields ¦ m = 1 4 µ 2 s, which is also the pro¯t level of M if no innovation takes place. µ c is derived from the following condition: U(µ c )¸0; that is, it represents the marginal utility of the consumer that is indi®erent between buying one unit from M
and not buying at all. All the consumers with higher marginal utility buy for sure, while consumers with µ < µ c do not buy (therefore, demand equals µ ¡ µ c ).
(2) In case of a TS, the aggregated pro¯t of the incumbent (we do not impose here the covered market assumption) is (¦ a denotes this level of pro¯t for M )
with e µ = P 2 ¡ P 1 s°± (19)
The subscript 1 denotes the existing product with quality level s; the innovative product with quality level s(± + 1) is labeled with subscript 2. Equation (19) gives the marginal utility of the indi®erent consumer (that is, the one that is indi®erent between buying from M and the innovative entrant); 28 equation (20) de¯nes the critical level of µ below which consumers with lower marginal utility do not buy, since utility falls below their reservation value of zero. Deriving the¯rst-order conditions for both prices yield:
Thus, the equilibrium prices are: with demands D 1 = 0 and D 2 = 1 2 µ respectively. M will therefore stop producing his old (existing) product.
Increasing P 1 is worthless, since demand for this product is already zero for P ¤ 1 ; and decreasing it reduces aggregate pro¯t, since it only shifts demand to product 1 (thus increasing e µ). To compensate,
M will have to lower P 2 . Pro¯t maximization occurs if M only produces the innovative product and sells it at P ¤ 2 . Thus, at equilibrium: ¦ a = 1 4 µ 2 s(°± + 1).
(3) In case of entry, let us denote by index 1 the incumbent and by index 2 the entrant. Thus, P 2 denotes the price for the innovative (quality-improved) product of the newcomer; P 1 is the price of the existing product in case both qualities are o®ered. Demand for product 1 and 2 are D 1 = e µ ¡ µ and D 2 = µ ¡ e µ, respectively. Their maximization problems are the following:
for the entrant.
with now e µ = P 2 ¡ P 1 s± :
This yields (¦ na denotes the pro¯t of M under an IPO; ¦ is the pro¯t level of the newcomer):
¦(±) = 1 9 (2µ ¡ µ) 2 s± and ¦ na (±) = 1 9 (µ ¡ 2µ) 2 s±:
We now have all the pro¯t levels at equilibrium needed for equation (3) . Since the reservation value of consumers was normalized to zero, we limit ourself to ± max so that, in case of entry, at equilibrium all consumers buy either from M (so that the consumer with µ also buys; i.e., U(µ) = µs ¡ P 1¸0 ) or E (so that U( e µ) = e µs(± + 1) ¡ P 2¸0 ). This is required from the covered market assumption, and de¯nes ± max´3 µ=[µ ¡ 2µ].
Part II: Proof of Hypothesis H4
In this appendix, we show the positive relationship between the number of incumbents and the likelihood for the venture to go public (hypothesis H4 in Section 8.1). Let us denote by n the number of incumbents in the product market prior to the potential entry of E and the threshold level of innovation by ± n c (now as a function of the number of incumbents). Thus, we need to show that ± It is certainly worth computing the equilibrium solution for Cournot competition also. Then, the shift to perfect competition is somewhat smoother. When doing this, we can establish qualitatively similar results regarding the relationship between ex ante market concentration and IPO activities.
